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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
PREPAREDNESS 
BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN,* SUSAN C. KIM** & LINDSAY F. WILEY*** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the United States has faced an array of large-
scale public health threats.  The events of September 11, 2001, quickly 
followed by the anthrax mailings, exposed the country’s vulnerability to 
physical and biological terrorist attacks.1  Global outbreaks of various life-
threatening infectious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), the West Nile Virus, and pandemic influenza have not only taken 
lives, but have also significantly affected political and economic systems on 
a national and international scale.2  Furthermore, the inadequate response 
to—and the aftermath of—Hurricane Katrina highlighted the direct link 
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 1. See Susan West Marmagas, Laura Rasar King & Michelle G. Chuk, Public Health’s 
Response to a Changed World: September 11, Biological Terrorism, and the Development of 
an Environmental Health Tracking Network, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1226, 1227 (2003) 
(discussing the need for increased protection of the public health infrastructure after the 
September 11 attacks). 
 2. Lawrence O. Gostin, Why Rich Countries Should Care About the World’s Least 
Healthy People, 298 JAMA 89, 90 (2007). 
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between the destruction of infrastructure caused by natural disasters and 
public health crises.3 
The emergence of these public health threats has prompted robust 
efforts to improve United States emergency preparedness4 at all levels of 
government.  While states and localities have traditionally had primary 
responsibility for conducting these kinds of public health activities,5 it has 
become clear that there is also a salient need for federal involvement in 
preparing for and responding to public health emergencies.  An effective 
response to a large-scale public health threat will require coordinated action 
across all levels of government.  Events of significant size and scope will 
almost certainly not be limited to one state or locality and will demand an 
extensive commitment of federal resources and guidance. 
As the public health community has engaged in efforts to improve the 
nation’s emergency preparedness infrastructure,6 many of the most dramatic 
changes have occurred at the federal level, including the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a new Cabinet department—the 
largest restructuring of federal administrative agency responsibility since the 
New Deal.7  For many years, the federal government has provided funding 
and guidance for disaster preparedness and recovery through its power to 
spend for the general welfare and its power to regulate interstate 
commerce.8  However, following the terrorist attacks of 2001 and 2002 and 
outbreaks of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, the federal 
government began to take a more proactive role in prevention of, 
 
 3. See generally SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR & 
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN 
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H.R. 
REP. NO. 109-377, at 1, 267 (2006) [hereinafter COMM. TO INVESTIGATE KATRINA], available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/katrina.html#zip (explaining the ineffectiveness 
of the public health infrastructure in the wake of the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina). 
 4. For purposes of this paper, we will use the term “public health emergency 
preparedness” (or just “emergency preparedness”) to encompass the policies and laws 
undertaken to protect the public from biological harms, including the prevention and 
mitigation of dangers to the public’s health posed by diseases, natural disasters, and 
bioterrorism. 
 5. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE KATRINA, supra note 3, at 201.  See also David L. Feinberg, 
Hurricane Katrina and the Public Health-Based Argument for Greater Federal Involvement in 
Disaster Preparedness and Response, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 596, 597 (2006). 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 1-2 (2004) [hereinafter 
NRP], available at http://www.iir.com/global/FusionCenter/NRPbaseplan.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 9, 78-79.  See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: LEADERSHIP AND 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY MERGER (2004), available at http://www. 
dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0345.shtm. 
 8. EILEEN SALINSKY, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, NHPF BACKGROUND PAPER: PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE “SYSTEM” 13 (2002), available at 
http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_Public_Health_4-02.pdf. 
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preparedness for, and response to biological weapons attacks and 
infectious disease outbreaks under the auspices of providing for national 
security.9 
This shift represents a departure from the traditional federal-state 
relationship in the area of emergency preparedness.  A longstanding 
principle of federal involvement in disaster response, which is clearly 
embodied in the National Response Plan (NRP), is the premise that 
“[i]ncidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic, 
organizational, and jurisdictional level.”10  The view of federal action as 
supplementary to state and local actions with respect to emergency 
preparedness is rooted in our federalist system, which grants limited powers 
to the federal government.11  As federal involvement in emergency 
preparedness grows, consideration of the constitutional bases for federal 
action in this arena and the potential constitutional limits on federal 
encroachment into traditional state functions becomes increasingly 
important. 
Increased federal involvement in emergency preparedness has also 
raised important questions about the way that federal laws, policies, and 
programs affect state and local preparedness and response efforts.  
Emergency preparedness combines one of the most fundamental functions 
of the federal government – national security12 – with one of the most 
fundamental functions of the state governments – public health.13  Among 
national security concerns, emergency preparedness is unique in that 
jurisdiction for preparedness and response is not exclusively federal.14  
Among public health concerns, biological weapons attacks and infectious 
disease outbreaks are distinguished by increasing federalization of 
preparedness and response.15  The result is “a myriad of laws [at the local, 
state, and federal level] that must be considered, most of which were 
developed to address more mundane public health matters, or designed to 
respond to more traditional emergency situations.”16 
 
 9. GEORGE W. BUSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf. 
 10. Id. at 6. 
 11. SALINSKY, supra note 8, at 12. 
 12. Homeland Security, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-
security (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). 
 13. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role 
of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 272 (1993). 
 14. See Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J. 
L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201 (2002). 
 15. See id. 
 16. John D. Blum, Too Strange to be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from a Bioterrorist 
Simulation, the Case of TOPOFF 2, 64 LA. L. REV. 905, 915 (2004). 
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This article will present qualitative interview data that were collected as 
part of a larger project to explore the impact of federal law on public health 
preparedness.17  As a foundation, Section II will briefly outline some of the 
most salient ways in which the federal role in public health preparedness has 
expanded in the past decade.  Section III will provide some background 
about the structure and purpose of the larger Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC)-funded project.  Section IV will present our findings 
from the final phase of this project—a series of qualitative interviews with 
federal policymakers.  These data will be presented in four parts: methods, 
results, discussion, and conclusion. 
II.  AN INCREASING FEDERAL ROLE IN PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 
The last decade has been marked by increasing federalization of public 
health preparedness and response—an area that was traditionally handled 
almost exclusively at the state and local level.18  The terrorist attacks of 
2001 and 2002, the SARS outbreak, and concerns about pandemic 
influenza prompted a series of federal legislative efforts to enhance 
emergency preparedness.  These include the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act),19 
the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Project Bioshield),20 the Public Readiness 
and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 (PREPA),21 and the Pandemic and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA).22  These legislative reforms 
were followed by federal efforts to develop comprehensive emergency 
response plans intended to implement and coordinate federal preparedness 
and response law, including the National Response Framework (NRF)23 and 
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan 
(NSPIIP).24 
 
 17. Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Role of Law in Public Health Preparedness: 
Opportunities and Challenges, Final Project Report 1 (April 23, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 18. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE KATRINA, supra note 3, at 201. 
 19. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 20. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 21. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 
247d-6e (2006). 
 22. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 23. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
NRF], available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 
 24. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY 
FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter NSPIIP], available at 
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/pandemicinfluenza.pdf. 
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Although nearly any federal statute might come into play in preparing 
for and responding to a public health emergency, there are two key statutes 
in which the majority of relevant federal law (including the reforms described 
above) is codified: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)25 and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).26  
The Stafford Act provides the framework for federal involvement in disaster 
relief and emergency assistance and sets forth various provisions for disaster 
and emergency preparedness.27  Relevant portions of the PHSA specifically 
address public health emergencies, which include biological security events 
as well as the public health consequences of other types of events.28  The 
NRF draws from both Acts, as well as from other sources of authority, to 
establish what is intended to be an “all-hazards” plan29 for responding to a 
variety of disasters and emergencies.  Similarly, the NSPIIP sets forth a 
coordinated plan for pandemic preparedness.30 
Both the Stafford Act and PHSA have been expanded to provide for an 
increased federal role.  While much of the Stafford Act deals with 
emergency and disaster response, the Act also now addresses the federal 
government’s role in preparedness efforts.31  Originally, the Act contained 
only a few provisions on preparation and mitigation,32 and some of these 
were limited to post-disaster mitigation – they applied only to areas that had 
already experienced a major catastrophe.33  Several amendments34 to the 
 
 25. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-
207 (2006).  See also NRP, supra note 6, at 5, 79 (presenting an overview of the Stafford 
Act). 
 26. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 27. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121-207 (2006). 
 28. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 247d, 300hh-13, 300hh-14 (2006). 
 29. See, e.g., Ernest B. Abbot, Homeland Security in the 21st Century: New Inroads on 
the State Police Power, 36 URB. LAW. 837, 840-41 (2004) (describing the evolution of the 
“all-hazards” approach to emergency management). 
 30. NSPIIP, supra note 24. 
 31. Although the original version of the Stafford Act contained some provisions on 
disaster mitigation, such provisions were significantly multiplied when the Act was amended by 
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.  See Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
390, 114 Stat. 1552 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 32. See, e.g., Disaster Relief Act of 1974 §§ 101, 401, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121, 5171 
(1982). 
 33. See, e.g., §§ 301-03, 306. 
 34. See, e.g., §§ 102, 302; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 1013(b)(1), 115 Stat. 399; Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and 
Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
73, 115 Stat. 688 (2001); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). 
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Act have since circumvented this limitation and have expanded the federal 
government’s authority to encourage disaster preparedness in all parts of 
the country. 
The PHSA,35 which “supplements, but does not supplant” the Stafford 
Act,36 similarly provides for a prominent federal role in planning for and 
responding to public health emergencies.37  In addition to outlining the role 
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in declaring a public health 
emergency to trigger federal assistance,38 a series of amendments to the 
PHSA have sought to enhance national preparedness for public health 
emergencies.  For example, in 2002, the Bioterorrism Act amended the 
PHSA to set aside funds specifically for assessing national public health 
preparedness needs and for grants to assist state and local government and 
private health-care sector preparedness efforts.39 
In 2006, PAHPA attempted to increase accountability for state and local 
spending of federal preparedness funds by requiring the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary to “develop and apply 
measurable evidence-based benchmarks and objective standards to 
measure the preparedness of state and local grantees, including annual test 
and exercise requirements.”40  PAHPA also specifically mandated the 
development of criteria for evaluating state pandemic influenza plans41 and 
DHHS and DHS have worked together to release an initial template for 
review criteria.42  However, the law allows use of “existing objective 
standards,”43 which means that for general all-hazards preparedness, DHHS 
and DHS may revert to the status quo of requiring states to collect data and 
 
 35. See Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and 
After a Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 134-35 (2007) (stating that the PHSA 
specifically addresses the responsibilities of the federal government during public health 
emergencies).  See also Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (2006). 
 36. Id. at 135. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-1 to -3, 247d-3a to-3b (2006). 
 40. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, READY OR NOT? PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH FROM 
DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND BIOTERRORISM 49-50 (2007). 
 41. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act Pub. L. No. 109-417, § 201, 120 Stat. 
2831, 2837, 2839-40 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006)). 
 42. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
PANDEMIC AND ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS ACT PROGRESS REPORT 17 (2007), available at 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror07/PAHPAProgressReport.pdf. 
 43. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act § 201 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006)). 
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report on six of the twenty-three performance measures set forth in the 
existing CDC preparedness goal.44 
In addition to increased federal funding of state and local preparedness, 
legislative reforms have also significantly expanded the federal government’s 
relatively recent forays into direct federal involvement in preparedness 
through the development and enhancement of the National Disaster 
Medical System (NDMS),45 the Emergency System for Advance Registration 
of Volunteer Health Professions (ESAR-VHP),46 the Strategic National 
Stockpile (“SNS”)47 of essential pharmaceutical resources, and the CDC’s 
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (“NEDSS”).48  The 
establishment and expansion of these programs signal that the federal 
government is moving beyond the confines of its traditional role as adviser 
and financer of state and local preparedness and response efforts.49 
In 2008, updates to the NRF similarly reflected an evolution in the 
relationship between federal, state, and local players in emergency and 
disaster response.50  Language that had once emphasized the primacy of 
 
 44. See, e.g., Announcement from Sylvia Dawson, Grants Team Lead, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to Colleagues at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
app. 1, at 7-8 (Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagree 
ment/pdf/fy07announcement.pdf; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA GUIDANCE SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2006 PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PHASE II 5, 20-25 (2006), available 
at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagreement/pdf/phase2-panflu-guidance.pdf. 
 45. The NDMS operates pursuant to section 2812 of the Public Health Service Act.  See 
38 U.S.C. § 8117(e) (2006). 
 46. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY 
SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP) – LEGAL 
AND REGULATORY ISSUES 9-14 (2006), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/ 
PDF/ESAR%20VHP%20Report.pdf.  The name has changed from ESAR-HPV to ESAR-VHP.  
See About ASPR, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.phe.gov/about/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2006). 
 48. National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nedss/index.htm (last visited July 30, 2010). 
 49. See, e.g., Bill Frist, Public Health and National Security: The Critical Role of Increased 
Federal Support, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 117, 120-21 (“Congress appropriated a 
record $3 billion in December 2002 for antibioterrorism activities, including more than $1 
billion dedicated to upgrading state and local public health capabilities and hospital 
preparedness.”). 
 50. The National Response Plan of 2004 emphasized that “incidents are typically 
managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level.”  See 
NRP, supra note 6, at 6.  The National Response Framework of 2008 softened this statement 
and added new language pointing to the importance of federal involvement:  “Incidents must 
be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities 
when needed.  It is not necessary that each level be overwhelmed prior to requesting 
resources from another level.”  See NRF, supra note 23, at 10. 
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local control was softened to highlight the importance of the federal role, 
while stopping short of promising federal responsibility for response efforts.51  
Furthermore, the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRF now provides for 
expedited and increased federal involvement in response efforts under 
certain extreme conditions.52  When triggered by a catastrophic event, the 
revisions bypass traditional requirements that a state governor request 
federal assistance and that an incident first must overwhelm state and local 
resources before federal authorities may become involved.53 
Estimates of overall federal funding for emergency preparedness vary, 
depending how broadly one defines the term.  One report from the 
Government Accountability Office calculates that from 2002 through 2007, 
approximately $19 billion was distributed by DHS for emergency 
preparedness, equipment, and training.54  It should be noted that this 
estimate includes grants intended to help prepare for and respond to major 
disasters of all types, including terrorist attacks.55  Alternatively, a 
Congressional Research Service report focusing specifically on public health 
preparedness states that “Congress has provided more than $9 billion in 
grants to states to strengthen public health and hospital preparedness” 
(approximately $1 billion per year) since 2002.56  In a recent analysis of 
U.S. emergency preparedness efforts, Trust for America’s Health determined 
that total federal funding for state and local all-hazard public health and 
pandemic preparedness efforts amounts to more than $11 billion over the 
past seven years.57 
 
 51. NRF, supra note 23, at 10. 
 52. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT 
ANNEX 1, 6 (2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_Catastrophic 
IncidentAnnex.pdf. 
 53. See id. 
 54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-488T, HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS 
IMPROVED ITS RISK-BASED GRANT PROGRAMS’ ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT METHODS, BUT 
MEASURING PROGRAMS’ IMPACT ON NATIONAL CAPABILITIES REMAINS A CHALLENGE 1 (2008). 
 55. Id. 
 56. SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40159, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: ISSUES IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 5 (2009). 
 57. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, supra note 40, at 57.  While these estimates vary, they 
all indicate that significant federal funding is being allocated for state and local preparedness 
activities.  Given that our analysis is designed to focus on the effect of federal laws on state 
and local preparedness activities, we do not attempt to resolve this debate.  The exact amount 
is less important than the shape of these federal funding mechanisms and the impact that 
these grant programs are having on state and local preparedness efforts. 
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III.  A PROJECT TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
To date, there has been little systematic examination of the effects 
(positive or negative) that this expanding federal role has on public health 
emergency preparedness.  Except for the on-going studies funded by the 
CDC’s Public Health Law Program (PHLP),58 existing public health research 
efforts that examine how public health operates have not often considered 
law to be an important variable.59  The PHLP studies are a promising 
beginning, though most of their projects deal with the effects of law on 
specific programs (such as AIDS and immunization laws)60 as opposed to 
studying the law’s influence on the broader public health system as this 
paper will begin to describe. 
To be sure, reforming public health law has been a topic of 
considerable discussion, especially for bioterrorism preparedness.61  The 
development of the CDC’s Model State Emergency Health Powers Act62 by 
the Georgetown/Hopkins CDC Collaborating Centers for Law and the 
Public’s Health (CLPH) is a prime example of the role law plays in 
organizing public health practice.63  With the help of government officials, 
public health experts, and other major stakeholders, CLPH faculty and staff 
drafted and disseminated the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
(MSEHPA), which gave local and state officials increased authority to protect 
 
 58. See Public Health Law Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/research.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).  See also Edward L. 
Baker, Jr. & Jeffrey P. Koplan, Strengthening The Nation’s Public Health Infrastructure: Historic 
Challenge, Unprecedented Opportunity, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 22.  (“To improve 
the legal foundation for public health practice and particularly to examine the need for 
updating of public health statutes, the Public Health Law Program was created in 2000”). 
 59. Scott Burris et al., Making the Case for Laws That Improve Health: A Framework for 
Public Health Law Research, 88 MILBANK Q. 169, 170 (2010). 
 60. See, e.g., Public Health Law Program, supra note 58. 
 61. See generally, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S 
HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2002) (stating that pioneering work has gone into assisting states 
in reforming their public health laws to address health preparedness needs, but a more 
comprehensive effort is needed); Laura H. Kahn, State Report: A Prescription for Change: The 
Need for Qualified Physician Leadership in Public Health, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 
241, 241-48 (stating that since the threat of future bioterrorism attacks will remain in the 
future, state public health laws must be reformed). 
 62. See generally CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS U., 
THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 1 (2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA], available at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. (“The Act requires the development 
of a comprehensive plan to provide a coordinated, appropriate response in the event of a 
public health emergency.”). 
 63. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual 
Rights and Common Goods, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 83, 83. 
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individuals and property during states of emergency.64  Forty-four states and 
the District of Columbia have passed laws incorporating some portion of 
MSEHPA.65  The Turning Point initiative has similarly stimulated reforms of 
state-level public health codes.66  Neither project, however, was designed to 
investigate empirically the role of law in public health practice. 
This article presents data seeking to address this empirical void.  Given 
increased federal involvement in public health preparedness activities, we 
undertook a project to provide policymakers with the first systematic 
empirical analysis to understand how federal law shapes the public health 
system’s disease preparedness activities and how public health officials are 
adjusting to the changing federal legal environment.  In particular, we 
aimed to study the mechanisms through which federal laws provide funds for 
specific activities and how these mechanisms shape, or constrain, the ways 
in which states and localities can spend the funds. 
As a framework for this project, we adopted the model set forth by 
Mendez et al., which depicts a mechanism whereby physicians are 
influenced by both an objective legal environment and a perceived legal 
environment (see Figure 1).67  The study framework anticipated that public 
health officials will not necessarily have an accurate understanding of the 
key legal requirements in public health preparedness laws, but are more 
likely to be influenced by what they perceive the legal environment to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 64. Id. at 84. 
 65. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 
(MSEHPA): STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 1 (2006), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ 
MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf. 
 66. Bobbie Berkowitz & Jack Thompson, The Turning Point Initiative:  Responding to 
Challenges in Public Health, 17 WASH. PUB. HEALTH 44, 44-45 (2000). 
 67. David Mendez et al., The Effect of Legal and Hospital Policies on Physician Response 
to Prenatal Substance Exposure, 7 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 187, 188 (2003). 
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Phase 1 of the project involved constructing a detailed account of the 
objective legal environment.  To examine how law affects the structure of the 
public health system and its ability to respond more effectively to the threat 
of emerging infectious disease threats and other public health preparedness 
needs, we first described, categorized, and analyzed current federal 
mandates and funding arrangements affecting state and local public health 
systems.  This work was based on the premise that federal law provides a 
general structure and framework for public health activities,68 while state 
and local law provides parameters for the implementation and delivery of 
specific programs and services.69 
Although bioterrorism and emergency response efforts largely take place 
at the local level, with public health as the core of first responders,70 federal 
law substantially influences how state and local health departments allocate 
their resources.71  Thus, our research in federal law focused on identifying 
specific topical mandates, as well as analyzing funding mechanisms 
provided to achieve those mandates. 
Phase 2 involved a series of comparative case studies to determine how 
state and local public health departments respond to emerging infectious 
disease threats, bioterrorism, and other public health preparedness 
challenges and how state laws shape those responses.  These case studies 
enabled us to capture the perceived legal environment: local policymakers’ 
understanding of what they are expected, or required, to accomplish and 
the programmatic choices they make under federal law.  We anticipated 
that public health officials would be influenced by what they believe they are 
expected to do, but that their perceptions may not match the objective legal 
requirements. 
Phase 3 involved a study of the federal government’s evolving role in 
shaping policy and law affecting public health.  Through a series of 
interviews with a variety of federal policymakers, we aimed to determine 
their understanding of the relationship between federal laws and state and 
local preparedness activities.  We attempted to explore how federal officials 
view current public health preparedness functions; what public health role 
they see for the federal government in the future; how their views will affect 
state and local public health functions; how bioterrorism and emergency 
response funds have been monitored, with particular attention to the relation 
to other public health funding streams; and how funding streams for 
 
 68. See Anne Morse, Bioterrorism Preparedness for Local Health Departments, 19 J. 
COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING 203, 205 (2002). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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pandemic flu and other emergent infectious diseases have been determined 
and coordinated. 
The remainder of this article presents our qualitative interview data 
about how federal policy-makers view the federal government’s current role 
in preparedness activities and how that role will evolve in the future.  The 
analysis will focus on the extent to which there is discordance between the 
objective legal framework and the subjective views of federal policy-makers 
about how the federal legal framework impacts state preparedness activities. 
IV.  IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON STATE PREPAREDNESS: FEDERAL POLICY-MAKER 
PERSPECTIVE 
The original data reported here were collected to specifically explore 
federal policy-makers’ subjective perceptions of the relationship between 
federal law and state/local public health preparedness activities.  Our goal 
was to examine how federal policymakers view the federal government’s 
current role in preparedness activities and how that role will evolve in the 
future.  Given our previous work on the objective federal legal framework 
for preparedness activities, we also wanted to compare these findings to the 
respondents’ subjective understanding of the ways in which federal law 
affects state and local public health functions.  In particular, our study was 
interested in the implementation and monitoring of federal public health 
funding mechanisms and the implications that these programs have for state 
and local public health preparedness activities. 
A. Methods 
1. Selection of Respondents 
In selecting interview candidates, attention was paid to ensuring a 
diverse range of respondents in terms of experience, training, and 
institutional affiliation.  Even though the majority of questions were legal in 
nature, both lawyers and non-lawyers were interviewed.  In order to capture 
high-level policy perspectives, as well as detailed on-the-ground experience, 
both junior and senior agency officials were selected.  Given the range of 
federal agencies involved in public health preparedness activities, 
respondents were recruited from all key governmental entities, with a focus 
on DHS [including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)] 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) [including the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), 
CDC, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)]. 
Recruitment of potential respondents was an iterative process.  After the 
relevant federal organizations had been identified, target individuals within 
these organizations were selected to interview.  Once that process was 
completed, formal invitation letters were sent out via email.  Subsequent 
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follow-up was conducted through additional emails and telephone calls.  
After a sufficient number of affirmative responses had been received, the 
interview process was started.  As interviews were conducted, recruitment 
efforts were augmented by asking each respondent to identify potential 
respondents at the close of each interview.  In total, fourteen individuals 
were interviewed.  Respondents from all agencies included senior-level 
administrators responsible for general oversight of their agencies’ 
preparedness activities, as well as key staff tasked with day-to-day 
operational duties.  As such, a range of experiences and expertise was 
captured at both DHS and DHHS (and their affiliated sub-agencies).  We do 
not expect that additional interviews would have altered our results. 
All participants were assured confidentiality and were promised that 
neither they, nor their institution, would be identifiable.  Therefore, this 
paper does not report any information that could uniquely identify any 
institution or respondent. 
2. Interview Format and Design 
A semi-structured interview protocol was developed for use in both in-
person and telephone interviews.  This protocol was designed in parallel 
with the state and local interview protocol, but was adjusted for federal 
respondents.  Additionally, the protocol was structured so that questions 
could be asked in either an individual or group setting.  Overall, the 
protocol was designed to provide consistency across interviews and 
institutions, as well as to help organize note-taking.  To account for the type 
of position and level of responsibility of each respondent, there were slight 
variations made to the protocol for each interview. 
The protocol generally consisted of open-ended questions that gave the 
interviewers flexibility to explore unanticipated, but fruitful, avenues of 
inquiry.  The questions fell into three broad categories: 1) evaluation and 
oversight of preparedness activities; 2) collaboration and communication; 
and 3) suggested improvements.  Within these categories, additional topics 
were explored in greater depth, such as the allocation and tracking of 
federal funds to support state preparedness efforts, federal oversight over 
state initiatives, barriers to effective implementation of state preparedness 
activities, and communications among federal, state, and local entities. 
3. Data Collection and Analysis 
The interviews were conducted both in-person and on the telephone.  
Generally lasting about sixty minutes, the interviews were primarily 
conducted by a project investigator.  Student research assistants provided 
additional note-taking support for a number of interviews.  If the respondent 
consented, the interviews were digitally recorded for transcription purposes.  
As such, transcripts were generated either from the audio recording or 
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hand-written notes.  To the extent possible, transcripts captured participants’ 
verbatim responses. 
Once transcribed, N6 qualitative data analysis software, the latest 
version in the NUD*IST series, was utilized.  Qualitative analysis software 
offers a number of tools to organize and compare complex data in one file.  
After reviewing the transcripts, a list of key words was chosen for preliminary 
analysis using a text search, which placed the selected word or phrase in 
context.  The results of these text searches led to the development of nodes, 
which organized the data into broader concepts. 
This was followed by a comprehensive review of the transcripts by the 
research team.  The interviews were read independently by four people, two 
of whom were not involved in administering the interviews.  To minimize 
bias, initial content theme analysis was conducted by the fourth reader who 
was not present at any of the interviews.  Each reader was instructed to 
review all interviews, placing salient statements into one or more nodes, not 
limited to the categories identified by the qualitative data software.  Readers 
were then instructed to examine the statements in each individual node to 
determine if they could be organized into coherent subtopics.  After 
extensive discussion between the readers, this analysis was revised and 
expanded. 
4. Study Limitations 
This study has methodological limitations that should be considered 
when interpreting the results.  First, basic resource constraints limited the 
number of interviews that we were able to conduct.  Though our 
respondents’ respective agencies are generally reflective of the institutional 
diversity in the federal government, the small number of participants cannot 
completely capture the range of opinions within and between these 
agencies.  While we believe that we interviewed a sample of very 
knowledgeable and influential people, we recognize that we have no way of 
assessing whether their views on the issues discussed mirror those of the 
larger population of people who are responsible for formulating and 
executing public health policy. 
Second, our sampling may be limited by self-selection bias.  We only 
spoke to participants who agreed to be interviewed, so it is possible that 
individuals who were particularly occupied disproportionately declined 
interview.  Although our respondents provided us with a diversity of 
information, we may not have fully captured all existing perspectives.  The 
participants may not be fully representative of all views at each organization.  
Some of the individuals whom we would have liked to interview were either 
unwilling or unable to meet with us.  For the most part, we believe we did 
not encounter this problem to any significant degree. 
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Third, our findings are limited to our participants’ self-reports.  We did 
not engage in an analysis of whether our participants’ statements reflect 
actual preparedness outcomes. 
B. Results 
The respondents’ comments can be divided into four distinct categories, 
each with a number of subtopics.  First, we begin with the respondents’ 
descriptions of the respective roles of federal and state governments.  
Second, we examine the respondents’ discussion of coordination between 
agencies and between different levels of government.  Third, we explore the 
perceived impact of federal funding mechanisms and procedures on states’ 
preparedness activities.  Finally, we investigate the techniques used to 
improve compliance and to ensure accountability. 
1. Delineating State and Federal Responsibilities 
a. The Role for Federal Government 
While a minority of respondents mentioned the need for further 
clarification and definition of federal and state roles, overall there seemed to 
be a broadly shared understanding of the federal role vis-à-vis states and 
localities.  Most respondents noted that the primary role of the federal 
government should be to provide resources and to empower, inform, and 
educate states and localities to effectively plan for emergencies.  This 
dominant position implies an understanding that there are limits on the 
appropriate role of the federal government with regard to preparedness 
activities.  While recognizing its limits, a minority of these respondents 
expressed that the federal government must also be cognizant of the limited 
capacity of the state and local governments in some situations and must be 
ready to respond accordingly.  A few of the respondents stressed that some 
activities should be exclusively under the purview of the federal government, 
such as the development of countermeasures. 
Furthermore, a majority of the respondents expressed that there is a 
unique role for the federal government as a coherent “enterprise” capable 
of supporting research that leads to the development of capacity to deliver 
products that will protect the public’s health in the event of an emergency 
(e.g., vaccines, antitoxins).  The development of such products should be a 
“national” priority as opposed to one that could be reserved to a particular 
state or locality.  As one respondent noted, the federal government is best 
positioned to stimulate and translate research into the actual development 
of the products that will protect the public’s health.  Federal officials have 
the requisite bargaining power to coordinate the mass production of drugs 
and diagnostic technology.  Consistent with this position, the majority of 
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participants also seemed to agree that states and localities cannot (and 
should not) support their own drug and diagnostic research. 
b. State Autonomy 
A vocal minority emphasized the importance of state autonomy.  So 
long as they abide by broad federal parameters, states should be given the 
discretion to establish their own prioritization decisions.  States should be 
allowed to establish priorities based on their respective capacities.  For 
example, with respect to centralized countermeasure distribution, some 
states may not be able to effectively engage in that type of activity due to 
geographic distribution, population characteristics, and general 
infrastructure.  As such, in defining parameters, these respondents 
articulated that it is import for the federal government to acknowledge that 
states will have different capacities for preparedness planning.  Moreover, 
federal guidance and parameters should be flexible enough to allow for the 
inevitable variance across states. 
c. The Role of Non-governmental Actors 
In addition to the roles of federal and state governments, a few 
respondents raised the issue of the role for private entities and individuals.  
These participants discussed an emerging paradigm shift within 
preparedness activities: effective planning for all-hazards is a model built 
upon “shared responsibility.”  Experts no longer have the ability to solve 
problems on their own.  This means that the government at both the state 
and federal levels should recognize and take advantage of entities outside 
of the government.  Furthermore, governments should acknowledge that 
some individuals and businesses may have a more efficient ability to 
disseminate information and products in the event of an emergency.  For 
example, large private retailers, such as Wal-Mart may be more centrally 
and conveniently placed in remote areas to serve as distribution centers for 
countermeasures.   
d. Removing Barriers 
A minority of respondents further noted that where there is room for 
participation by multiple actors in public health preparedness initiatives 
(ranging from research to delivery), the federal government should 
encourage all relevant actors to participate by removing barriers.  For 
example, private stakeholders may be reluctant to engage in preparedness 
activities because they are concerned with liability issues.  These respondents 
pointed out that legislation, such as the PREP Act, in specific situations 
provides limited liability protection for actors who participate in emergency 
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response, as well as a compensation fund for individuals injured by those 
private actors.72 
Along these lines, a few respondents noted particular concern regarding 
barriers posed by procurement law.  Currently, both the federal government 
and many state governments engage with the private sector as a vendor in 
response to an event.73  This, in turn, makes it difficult to identify the assets 
and capabilities that the private sector can provide during a public health 
emergency without some sort of pre-event contracting.74  These respondents 
found that the continued contractual relationship between public and private 
entities in the course of preparedness activities does not sufficiently address 
current public health preparedness concerns.  The primary identified 
problem with this relationship is that state and federal governments are 
unable to work with the private sector in advance of an event.  The public-
private relationship begins during or after a threat has manifested, which 
means that the response is reactionary as opposed to being planned and 
coordinated in advance.  For example, if the federal government was able 
to develop a national contract with large transportation companies 
beforehand, states would know then which companies to turn to during an 
event.  Along these lines, having to contract with private vendors in the midst 
of an event may lead to working with entities that are not objectively the 
most appropriately positioned to respond to a given situation. 
2. Encouraging Coordination and Shared Focus Between Various 
Emergency Preparedness Actors 
a. Silos of Perceived Authority 
A majority of respondents expressed that there is a disconnect between 
entities because of inter-institutional authority disputes, or “silos of perceived 
authority” as one respondent described it.  At the federal level, most 
participants seemed to agree that bureaucratic turf battles between federal 
agencies will impede any attempts to create a truly unified and coordinated 
system.  This situation is exacerbated by the tension between the divergent 
priorities of Congress and the various federal agencies.  Furthermore, there 
was a concern that relevant bodies at the state and federal level do not 
sufficiently collaborate with each other.  While a minority of respondents 
 
 72. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e (2006). 
 73. BARBARA ANDERSEN ET AL., INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. & COUNTERTERRORISM, ARE WE READY?: 
A PRACTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC HEALTH 
CRISES 14-15 (2006). 
 74. Brooke Courtney et al., Healthcare Coalitions: The New Foundation for National 
Healthcare Preparedness and Response for Catastrophic Health Emergencies, 7 BIOSEC. & 
BIOTERRORISM 153, 156 (2009). 
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expressed a belief that this is largely due to the much documented lack of 
clarity about jurisdiction and role, a separate minority articulated a concern 
that states are not given sufficient voice in the development of federal 
preparedness policies.  By this latter account, the regularly changing and 
inconsistent guidance and parameters associated with federal grants merely 
confuse and frustrate states, leading to a perception that federal and state 
authorities are not aligned.  One respondent also identified resource 
constraints as a contributing factor.  This respondent expressed that most 
preparedness entities, post-September 11, are dramatically under-resourced 
and therefore lack the capacity to create connections with other parts of the 
government that they need to get their jobs done. 
b. Unity of Effort 
A majority of respondents, representing all of the selected agencies, 
concurred that federal agencies must jointly create a shared vision.  
Harmonization is especially important today, where a great deal of funding 
is directed towards preparedness efforts.75  A minority of participants noted 
the multitude of stakeholders with disparate agendas fighting over the spoils.  
Even though many respondents described coordination barriers, there was 
an increasing sense of optimism.  The dominant position was one of hope 
about the direction of federal funding, finding that there seems to be an 
emerging “unity of effort” related to a deliberate federal attempt to 
harmonize emergency preparedness grant-making programs.  A few 
respondents noted the overarching administrative attempts to harmonize 
grant programs.  For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 
(HSPD-21), the Executive Directive establishing the National Strategy for 
Public Health and Medical Preparedness, notes the necessity of a rational, 
inclusive, public health response and delivery system.76  Additionally, a few 
respondents mentioned the regular meetings of inter-agency workgroups to 
discuss common issues, including an enterprise governance board 
comprised of influential members of DHHS, DHS, and the Department of 
Defense (DoD). 
 
 75. Eileen Salinsky & Elin A. Gursky, The Case for Transforming Governmental Public 
Health, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1017, 1021 (2006).  See also Frist, supra note 49, at 120 (stating 
that federal funding has increased six hundred percent for antibioterrorism activites). 
 76. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 21: PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS passim (2007) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 21], 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1219263961449.shtm (indicating that this 
directive will transform the national approach to protecting public health against all disasters). 
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3. Issues Relating to Federal Funding 
a. Matching and Maintenance Requirements 
A strong minority of respondents raised issues surrounding the problem 
of matching funds.  Federal grants are often contingent on states allocating 
a predetermined matching amount each year in order to maintain eligibility 
to receive continued funding for a specific project.  Such legal provisions 
are designed to encourage states to allocate their own resources to 
preparedness programs.  For example, the Emergency Management 
Performance Grants require states to match at a fifty percent level of federal 
funds.77  States that cannot commit to matching funds for preparedness 
activities will be forced to reject corresponding federal funding.  A similar 
problem was identified relating to maintenance funding requirements. 
b. Mismatched Budgetary and Appropriations Cycles 
A majority of respondents discussed the reality that local, state, and 
federal appropriations and budgetary cycles are frequently not aligned.  At 
the federal level, funds are often available for only a short time.  For 
example, the CDC awards money in early August, but must close its books 
by mid-September.78  These mismatched cycles often do not allow enough 
time for states to apply for grants or plan for the implementation of federally 
funded programs. 
c. Inconsistent, Single-year Funding 
A strong minority also identified multiple barriers presented by 
inconsistent and unpredictable grant levels, much of which has been 
implemented through emergency supplemental funding in one-year 
increments.  Funding peaks and troughs (often associated with the rise and 
fall of a specific threat, such as pandemic influenza)79 make it difficult to 
create and then provide continuous support for programs. 
 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS: 
GUIDANCE AND APPLICATION KIT 5 (2008). 
 78. Announcement from Sharon H. Robertson, Grants Management Officer, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to Colleagues at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(May 13, 2010), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cdcpreparedness/coopagreement/10/ 
PHEP%20BP10%20Extension%20Guidance_Instructions_Appendices_05-13-2010_FINAL.pdf. 
 79. Jennifer B. Nuzzo, Michael Mair & Crystal Franco, Preserving Gains from Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreements, 7 BIOSEC. & BIOTERRORISM 35, 36 
(2009). 
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4. Accountability, Performance Evaluation, and Enforcement 
a. Overlapping, Inconsistent, and Unclear Grant Guidance 
A few respondents discussed the implications of allowing federal funding 
to come from multiple sources.  With so many streams of funding, there are 
a correspondingly diverse set of statutes, regulations, and agency 
guidelines, all of which states are expected to follow.80  For example, one 
respondent gave a detailed account of a potential confusion arising from a 
discrepancy between the specific record-keeping requirements imposed by 
various Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars and the flexible 
language contained in many specific grant guidance documents.  These 
respondents also specifically mentioned that the volume of reporting 
requirements can be overwhelming to states. 
b. Role, Scope, and Effect of Grant Guidance 
There was much discussion about the impact that federal grant 
guidance has on state preparedness activities.  The majority of respondents, 
representing all selected agencies, described a generally permissive 
environment with significant state flexibility to achieve broad goals 
articulated by federal policy-makers.  One respondent characterized grant 
guidance as the laying out of objectives and expectations to help shape 
state actions, with examples of allowable-type costs to provide more detail if 
necessary.  Another respondent acknowledged that grant guidance contains 
provisions requiring certain state activities, but preferred to see grant 
guidance less as an imposition of requirements and more as a way of 
influencing programmatic priorities at the state and local levels.  A third 
respondent echoed the notion of guidance as a tool to influence state and 
local priorities, but characterized his agency as a conduit between Congress 
and the states, with grant guidance serving as the mechanism that helps 
states determine how best to organize their preparedness activities.  In slight 
contrast, one respondent from DHS believed that state autonomy was 
important, but also discussed how some recent grant guidance has gotten 
more proscriptive by narrowing the menu of allowable activities, describing 
this as a strategy to focus efforts in areas perceived to need the most urgent 
work. 
 
 80. 44 C.F.R. § 13.40 (2009); NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTY & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, FEDERAL 
FUNDING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: IMPLICATIONS AND ONGOING ISSUES 
FOR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 2, 7, 9 (2007); SALINSKY, supra note 8, at 15. 
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c. Progress Reporting and Monitoring 
A strong minority of respondents acknowledged that objective, 
quantifiable measurement of preparedness benchmarks or standards is 
difficult, especially since it is hard to define preparedness and response, and 
it is extremely challenging to measure these capacities outside of an actual 
emergency event.  Nevertheless, efforts to design appropriate metrics are 
ongoing.  Early progress reporting was somewhat unsuccessful: data 
returned from the states had significant information missing, variation was 
extremely wide, and much of the data were limited by caveats.  Recently, 
federal policy-makers have had success using metrics based on capacity to 
act, focusing on time as the quantifiable variable. 
d. Penalties for Non-compliance 
Most respondents generally did not perceive punitive measures for non-
compliance as a productive strategy.  Consistent with other findings, the 
federal officials that discussed penalties articulated the notion that they were 
not looking to fund specific processes, but rather were concerned about 
state-level preparedness outcomes.  They saw the federal role as one of 
encouraging learning and improvement in state planning and preparedness 
systems; federal grants were designed to leave each jurisdiction the flexibility 
to achieve the stated goal through whatever techniques or strategies they 
wanted.  As such, the majority of respondents repeatedly stressed that it was 
never their intention or desire to articulate specific tasks, and then punish 
states for failing to meet those specific goals.  In fact, there was concern 
expressed about mandatory punitive measures, specifically statutory withhold 
requirements.  Under the recent Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Act (PAHPA), federal agencies are required to develop performance 
measures and evidence-based benchmarks.81  If states do not meet these 
standards, the statute theoretically requires the withholding of funds.82  A few 
respondents remained uncertain about how this provision will be 
implemented and the effects it might have. 
 
 81. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, § 201, 120 Stat. 
2831 (2006). 
 82. Id.  See also SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22602, PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: ISSUES IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 2 (2008) [hereinafter 
LISTER, ISSUES IN THE 110TH CONGRESS] (noting that the PAHPA gives added authority to 
withhold funds for failure to meet requirements). 
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C. Discussion 
1. An Emerging “Shared Responsibility” Paradigm 
Emergency preparedness and response has traditionally been a 
predominantly local concern.83  The role of federal agencies has been 
expanding in recent years, however, particularly as federal funding 
mechanisms for emergency preparedness have proliferated.84  These 
competing claims have resulted in predictable confusion about the proper 
role for federal, state, and local governments in preparing for a public 
health emergency.  This was most striking after Hurricane Katrina, when 
local, state, and federal preparedness and response efforts were heavily 
criticized as government entities battled uncertainties about jurisdictional 
authority and took turns blaming one another for shortcomings.85 
As such, it was not surprising that respondents repeatedly discussed the 
need for a better understanding of the various roles of state and federal 
governments with respect to preparedness activities.  Even though federal 
policy-makers acknowledged that more clarity was needed, there was a 
widely-held view that further delineation of roles should be strongly guided 
by the principle of federalism.  Notably, the majority of respondents did not 
believe that the federal government should take an overly assertive role in 
state preparedness activities.  Rather, the dominant articulated view was 
consistently one of complementary partnership, collaboration, and shared 
responsibility; whenever possible, state autonomy should be respected, and 
federal involvement should be limited to activities that it is uniquely situated 
to perform. 
This vision of shared responsibility is clearly still evolving.  When probed 
for details about the specific delineation of responsibilities, the line between 
state and federal responsibilities proved to be somewhat less defined.  
Certainly, broad consensus existed surrounding some types of non-
contentious activities.  For example, the federal government, with 
concentrated funds and access to broad scientific resources, should be 
responsible for providing collective goods (e.g., medical countermeasures) 
that individual states would be unable to produce on their own. 
More controversially, a minority of respondents held that the federal 
government should also be responsible for identifying and addressing 
common barriers that might hinder preparedness activities, such as fear of 
liability, or unwieldy procurement mechanisms.  While all states have their 
 
 83. See SALINSKY, supra note 8. 
 84. See Betty Bekemeier & Jan Dahl, Turning Point Sets the Stage for Emergency 
Preparedness Planning, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 377, 377 (2003). 
 85. See Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 120, 120 (2008). 
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own liability laws and procurement relationships,86 a couple of respondents 
felt that federal actors may be in a position to more efficiently or effectively 
mitigate these sorts of barriers through the passage of a national law or 
policy, or through the promulgation of model laws or policies that states can 
voluntarily adopt. 
Finally, even though there was much discussion of partnership and 
“shared responsibility” between federal and state governments, a minority of 
respondents implied concern about balancing roles in a crisis.  These 
respondents indicated that the federal government must remain alert to the 
limited abilities of state and local governments.  As such, they felt that 
federal policymakers must be prepared to step in with preparedness efforts 
when states are not successfully preparing themselves. 
It should not be surprising that the majority of federal policymakers 
articulated a vision of shared preparedness responsibility.  Federal 
policymakers understand that for historical, constitutional, and practical 
reasons, centralized government could never replace state and local 
responsibility for their populations’ health.87  But a framework of “shared 
responsibility” does not answer the vital question of how to allocate and 
divide roles between different levels of government.  While there seems to 
be an emerging consensus about the appropriateness of primary federal 
involvement in some areas, and the need to defer to states whenever 
possible, clearly further discussion is needed to clarify and define less 
obvious roles. 
2. Encouraging a Shared Focus and Coordination of Activities 
A majority of respondents articulated general concern about a perceived 
lack of coordination between federal agencies, and between state and 
federal levels of government.  A range of explanations was presented, some 
unsurprising (“bureaucratic turf battles” and lack of jurisdictional clarity) and 
some more intriguing.  It was interesting to hear federal policymakers 
articulate the notion that inter-governmental coordination could be 
improved by providing more funding to states, and by articulating less 
confusing federal grant guidance (discussed in more detail below).88 
Even though there was significant concern about improved coordination, 
optimism was an extremely common theme based on an emerging “unity of 
effort.”  Multiple examples of harmonization efforts were discussed and can 
be divided into three categories: federal intra-agency, federal inter-agency, 
and federal/state relationships.  While coordination efforts continue to 
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evolve and expand, by all accounts they have already begun to demonstrate 
some progress.  Notably, officials were most enthusiastic in their description 
of simple communication strategies (i.e., regularly scheduled conference 
calls, working group meetings, etc.) that have helped to coordinate activities 
within and among different agencies and levels of government.  
Additionally, there was strong support for the idea that federal agencies can 
increase shared focus and coordination through technical support and 
circulation of best practices or model laws.  For example, CDC provides 
technical guidance to states to help them think through legal issues, without 
imposing a one-size-fits-all solution.89  Instead, CDC encourages states to 
address an important issue themselves, while clarifying the respective roles 
of the various players at the federal and state levels.90 
Unfortunately, one area where serious coordination problems remain 
seems to be in the relationship between Congress and executive agencies.  
Congress prefers earmarks, while agencies would like greater flexibility to 
determine how to allocate the funds.91  There seems to be a disconnect 
between Congress and federal agencies in terms of how agencies should 
best allocate resources.  Perhaps because of underlying issues with their 
respective constituents, Congress seems to have a fixed understanding of 
how agency funds should be spent without taking shifting agency priorities 
into account. 
Our previous research on federally sponsored grant programs had 
indicated that the executive branch has put a number of mechanisms into 
place designed to coordinate preparedness activities into a coherent 
homeland security strategy.92  The interview data both supported and 
brought into question the effectiveness of these programs and policies.  
Taken together, the respondents’ positive and negative positions, sometimes 
held by the same people, suggest that respondents know about and support 
federal efforts to harmonize preparedness activities, but that concerns 
remain and continued vigilance and determined effort are needed to 
overcome “silos of perceived authority.”93  As one respondent appropriately 
noted, any expectations of increased harmonization should be tempered by 
the reality that the relevant federal programs are relatively new and are still 
being fine-tuned. 
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3. Unanticipated Barriers Imposed by Federal Funding Mechanisms 
For many years, the federal government has provided funding and 
guidance for disaster preparedness and recovery through its power to spend 
for the general welfare and its power to regulate interstate commerce.94  
Following the terrorist attacks of 2001 and 2002 and outbreaks of 
emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, however, the federal 
government began to take a more proactive role in the prevention of, 
preparedness for, and response to biological weapons attacks and 
infectious disease outbreaks under the auspices of providing for national 
security.95  In particular, the passage of PAHPA, PREP, the creation of the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA),96 and 
the advent of numerous grant programs97 has increased the percentage of 
state and local emergency preparedness dollars provided by the federal 
government.98  Since 2002, billions in federal funds have been distributed 
to federal, state, and local authorities to enhance emergency preparedness 
and response capabilities.99  Federal grants to state and local governments 
relevant to biosecurity preparedness are primarily administered by DHS and 
DHHS (primarily through CDC and ASPR).100  Our findings suggest that the 
specific implementation of these federal funding mechanisms has created a 
number of unanticipated effects on state preparedness activities. 
First, a number of these programs (including those established by 
PAHPA101) require states to commit matching or maintenance funds as a 
condition of receiving certain federal grants.  As the economy and property 
values have declined, state revenue has followed, creating huge budgetary 
shortfalls in all sectors.102  As states are unable to meet their matching or 
maintenance obligations, federal law will require that federal grant dollars 
be withheld or withdrawn.103  Perversely, this federally imposed grant 
condition, which was designed to encourage states to prioritize 
preparedness activities in their budgetary allocations, may actually lead to 
decreased funding for preparedness at the state level.  Loss of access to vital 
federal funds will simply compound preparedness challenges in an already 
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difficult state budgetary environment.  Unfortunately, it is unclear the extent 
to which there is any discretion in the implementation of this punitive 
provision.  Further analysis is required to ascertain the magnitude and scope 
of this problem, but if the views of these respondents are accurate, Congress 
and the relevant federal agencies should consider working together to 
create a procedure for suspending or waiving matching or maintenance 
requirements. 
Second, federal policy-makers perceived there to be a lack of 
synchronization between their grant-making processes and state budgetary 
cycles.  According to their report, prospective information about funding 
availability and magnitude can be limited, giving states very little time to 
prepare an application.  Magnifying this concern, states are often unable to 
take advantage of federal grant programs because their fiscal years do not 
line up.  Thus, state budgetary planning can happen well before or well after 
a federal funding window, effectively precluding participation, even when 
such funding would have been desirable.  Similarly, some states require that 
their legislative body pass an act in order to participate in a federal grant 
program,104 but some state legislatures meet infrequently, or only at certain 
times of the year.105  It will be interesting to compare these findings with the 
state policymaker reports, but assuming consistent accounts, federal grant 
programs should strive to provide states with a longer timeframe in which to 
develop and apply for funding. 
Finally, respondents also identified problems related to the short 
duration and unpredictability of federal preparedness programs.  
Specifically, most grants have been written one year at a time, with 
uncertainty about prospects for continuation or renewal.106  This aspect of 
the federal funding process increases the challenge of hiring, training, and 
retaining talented people.107  Preparedness efforts do not simply entail the 
purchase of supplies, and the construction of infrastructure; preparedness 
requires trained, competent people to fulfill the necessary functions.108  
Uncertain funding creates a lack of job stability, which makes it difficult to 
recruit talented and dedicated staff. 
Additionally, inconsistent, single-year grants impose a significant 
administrative burden on states.109  Under the current model, state officials 
 
 104. See George D. Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of State 
Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 280 (1979). 
 105. See 2010 State Legislative Session Calendar, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18630. 
 106. See Nuzzo, Mair & Franco, supra note 79, at 2. 
 107. Id. at 1-2. 
 108. Id. at 2. 
 109. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 181 
are spending a disproportionate amount of time applying for grants each 
year, rather than actually implementing programs.110  Potential momentum 
is lost by always having to focus on finding and obtaining the next source of 
funding.  This administrative burden is particularly exacerbated for states 
whose budgetary and appropriations processes do not match federal 
cycles.111  As discussed above, some states must balance the tension 
between their own internal budgetary processes and out-of-phase federal 
requirements;112 negotiating this fault line year after year can impede 
attempts to think about and implement long term, comprehensive 
preparedness strategies.  This barrier could be mitigated if federal 
preparedness grant programs focused on increasing the availability of 
multiple-year grants, and clarifying whenever possible the long-term funding 
prospects for specific preparedness programs. 
4. Evolving Accountability and Performance Evaluation Procedures 
Respondent comments indicated that there has been an evolution in the 
way that grant guidance is developed.  In the early years post 9/11, grant 
requirements and guidance came directly from the departmental level, with 
very little state and local involvement.113  Because of ensuing confusion 
about how this guidance could be interpreted, federal policymakers began 
reaching out to state and local public health officials [often through national 
associations such as the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 
(ASTHO) or National Association of County and City Health Officials 
(NACCHO)] to create a shared understanding of the meaning and intent of 
grant guidance requirements.114  This cooperative decision-making 
arrangement lasted until DHS stepped into a coordinating role and began 
to implement top-down explanations of grant guidance requirements, 
including articulation of specific target capabilities and preparedness 
metrics.115  CDC has continued to create a looser grant guidance system 
that provides more generalized instructions, delegating more flexibility to the 
states.116  These competing models continue to exist in parallel, but 
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respondents seemed to indicate that there is a prevailing trend away from 
top-down, explicitly directive grant guidance. 
This finding was reinforced by several respondent comments discussing 
the role of grant guidance.  Most argued that states should be given wide 
flexibility to act within a broad framework articulated by the federal 
government.  While respondents articulated different models for the specific 
role of federal guidelines (i.e., goals, objectives, expectations, “allowable-
type costs,” “programmatic priorities”) the majority were consistent in stating 
that they preferred not to see grant guidance as an imposition of 
requirements. 
Progress reporting and monitoring were frequently mentioned 
mechanisms for determining whether states are achieving the federal 
government’s articulated goals.  Consistent with the notion of grant 
guidance as a flexible framework, there seemed to be more interest in 
measuring overall capacity-building, rather than specific steps along the 
way.  In other words, according to the respondents, progress reporting was 
designed to be outcomes-oriented, rather than process-based.  As long as 
the state goals are consistent with federal guidance and policy, most specific 
activities will be allowed (as long as they are not grossly wasteful). 
Consistent with this paradigm are select grant programs that require 
states to articulate a periodic work plan, outlining what progress was made 
with the previous allotment of resources, and what they intend to do with the 
next segment of funds.117  These plans are not intended to lay out specific 
intermediate steps, but rather should lay out the state’s preparedness goals 
in a narrative form.  These narrative reports provide a contextual base for 
federal project officers to collaboratively work with states that are not 
achieving their goals; given federal technical expertise, project officers can 
help states understand what their needs are and can help them construct 
strategies for filling those gaps.  This collaborative strategy has been 
extremely helpful in engaging states as co-creators in the process, thus 
encouraging state buy-in and enthusiastic cooperation. 
All of these findings point towards a federal conception of accountability 
and performance evaluation that stresses flexibility and state autonomy.  
Even with a trend towards more flexible grant guidance, however, there was 
concern that the high volume of grant guidance documents can still pose a 
significant barrier.  Competing agency requirements and inconsistent 
language can create a complicated web of overlapping administrative, 
accounting, and reporting obligations, which can ultimately become an 
impediment to actual programmatic accomplishments.  Furthermore, 
according to federal policymakers, it seems as if states are sometimes 
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confused about the content of various requirements, and spend unnecessary 
time attempting to ascertain what is required of them. 
Given the complexity and volume of these preparedness grant 
programs, respondents were asked to discuss enforcement mechanisms and 
punitive measures at their disposal for worst-case scenarios where states 
repeatedly fail to advance preparedness goals.  Interestingly, respondents 
described a fairly non-draconian view of penalties for non-compliance.  
According to one respondent, prior to recent legislation, there was no 
requirement, or even ability to penalize states for non-compliance.  Federal 
grant makers could of course always have chosen to reduce or eliminate a 
state’s funding for a given project, but that would have been a prospective 
action, rather than retrospective punishment. 
This does not mean that there is no willingness to lean on states when 
necessary.  There was limited discussion of ways to encourage specific state 
action short of using the threat of explicit punishment.  For example, one 
respondent described a grant review process technique called “restriction” 
which involves actively working with states that have a good idea for 
spending federal money, but have not yet amassed sufficient information to 
justify implementation.  A restriction would be placed on the targeted money 
in the state accounts that would not be removed until a mutual agreement 
has been reached. 
Nevertheless, there was widespread concern about the ramifications of 
new statutorily mandated withhold requirements that are going into effect 
soon.  While there is some limited discretion at the secretary level to relax 
these penalties, the fear is that once this provision goes into effect, federal 
grant programs will be forced to start pulling back funds.  For example, 
PAHPA mandates a ten percent withhold per year, with the percentage of 
withheld funds increasing by an additional five percent for each consecutive 
failure.118  The prospect of these penalties was universally expressed as an 
extremely undesirable outcome.  Respondents hoped that senior officials will 
either grant waivers (in the case of mandatory withhold provisions) or will 
choose not to implement (in the case of authorized, but non-mandatory 
withhold powers).  In the meantime, federal grants programs are working 
closely with states in danger of failing, with the aim of helping them 
understand and meet the performance metrics.119 
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5. Respondent Knowledge of Objective Legal Environment 
An earlier phase of this project involved a detailed description of the 
objective legal environment.  To examine how law affects the structure of the 
public health system and its ability to respond more effectively to the threat 
of emerging infectious disease threats and other public health preparedness 
needs, we first described, categorized, and analyzed current federal 
mandates and funding arrangements affecting state and local public health 
systems.  This work was based on the premise that federal law provides a 
general structure and framework for public health activities, while state and 
local law provides parameters for the implementation and delivery of 
specific programs and services.  Our research in federal law focused on 
identifying specific topical mandates, as well as analyzing funding 
mechanisms provided to achieve those mandates. 
Throughout the analysis of the federal policymaker interviews, we cross-
referenced their statements with our earlier research on the objective legal 
environment.  We felt that it was important to ascertain the extent to which 
respondents had knowledge of the broad legal environment and the degree 
to which their understanding of federal preparedness laws and policies was 
consistent with our objective legal findings.  In general, this analysis was very 
positive.  Across all agencies and levels of seniority, respondents generally 
had a strong and accurate understanding of federal preparedness laws.  
Respondents were universally able to describe a wide range of detailed 
programs and were capable of discussing broad legal themes. 
Nevertheless, two potential discrepancies emerged.  First, while 
respondents possessed a detailed and accurate understanding of the federal 
preparedness environment, their comments seemed to focus on laws and 
programs related to their agency and specific area of emphasis.  It is 
understandable, and even predictable, that policymakers would have a 
tendency to discuss the topics with which they are most comfortable.  It does 
not necessarily follow from a lack of comment breadth that they are 
unfamiliar with federal grant programs outside of their jurisdiction.  Further 
research could be conducted to determine whether federal policymakers, in 
fact, do only focus on the most immediately relevant aspects of federal 
preparedness laws, and whether this has any ramifications for harmonization 
of federal preparedness efforts. 
Second, federal policymakers did not extensively discuss the possibility 
that the federal legal environment could be causing confusion at the state 
and local levels.  Our early research highlighted the complexity and 
ambiguity in federal grant programs.  We hypothesized that state and local 
public health officials could be experiencing significant difficulty 
distinguishing between the actions that the federal government requires 
them to perform as a condition of funding, versus those actions that are 
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merely suggested or encouraged.  Federal policymakers were quite frank in 
articulating the numerous barriers imposed by federal funding mechanisms, 
but did not include lack of clarity as a potential difficulty that states might 
face. 
D. Conclusion 
Engaging in public health preparedness involves a monumental and 
constantly shifting set of interwoven activities.  The goal of these interviews 
was to explore how federal policymakers see their role in the array of 
preparedness endeavors.  Unsurprisingly, more work needs to be done to 
define the line between federal and state roles and to coordinate priorities.  
Nevertheless, there are many hopeful signs that federal policymakers are at 
least aware of these challenges and are actively trying to improve the 
collaborative relationships vital to preparedness efforts. 
More surprising was the articulated view that federal preparedness 
funding mechanisms should be seen as driving priorities, rather than 
imposing specific requirements.  One of the project’s original core research 
questions concerned the extent to which the federal government was using 
its spending power to mandate certain state preparedness actions.  At least 
according to the federal policymaker data, federal law is affecting state 
preparedness activities less through mandates and more through 
unanticipated barriers created by federal funding mechanisms.  Additional 
research needs to be done to establish the nature and scope of these 
barriers, and to develop specific policy solutions, particularly after analyzing 
the state and local case studies in light of these findings. 
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